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Abstract
Managed lanes are a set of lanes where highway operations strategies are actively
applied in response to changing conditions. High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT) and Express
Toll lanes are examples of managed lanes. The transportation operations concept discussed in this article involves conversion of existing freeways (all lanes) into premiumservice free-flowing highways that provide fast, frequent, and inexpensive express bus
service and charge all private vehicles a variable toll—except for authorized buses
and certified ridesharing vehicles. The toll would vary by level of demand and would
be set high enough to guarantee that excessive demand will not cause a breakdown
of traffic flow. This article discusses the advantages of this concept. It introduces a new
sketch-planning tool that provides estimates of costs, benefits, and revenues from
applying the concept on a highway network in a prototypical large metropolitan
area. The estimates suggest that implementing the concept can provide significant
net social benefits. It may also generate sufficient new toll revenue to pay for all costs
for implementation and operation, including new express bus and park-and-ride
services that would complement the pricing scheme.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the U.S. Department of Transportation or the Federal Highway Administration.
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Introduction
Growing congestion on metropolitan highway networks poses a substantial threat
to the U.S. economy and to the quality of life of millions of Americans. In the
short term, congestion pricing—also known as value pricing—can relieve traffic
congestion and reduce the waste associated with it. In the United States, several
congestion pricing projects have been implemented involving separated lanes on
freeways called High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT) lanes, in which demand is managed
using variable tolls. Congestion pricing involves “open-road” tolling, or no toll
booths. All tolls are collected electronically at highway speeds.
This article introduces a comprehensive pricing concept termed “Super HOT”
transportation. It discusses the Super HOT concept, its advantages, the benefits
and revenues from establishing a Super HOT transportation network in a prototypical major metropolitan area, and its costs and financial feasibility.

The Super HOT Transportation Concept
Role of Congestion Pricing
Once freeway traffic exceeds a certain threshold level (measured in terms of flow
of vehicles per lane per hour, or in terms of density of vehicles per mile), both
vehicle speed and vehicle throughput drop precipitously. Data show that maximum vehicle throughput occurs at speeds of about 45 mph to 55 mph (Chen and
Varaiya 2002). When severe congestion sets in, the number of vehicles that get
through per hour can drop by as much as 50 percent, while speeds drop to “crawl”
speeds of 15 to 20 mph (Chen and Varaiya 2002). At high vehicle densities, traffic
bogs down due to traffic demand exceeding the supply of road space. Traffic flow
is kept in this condition of “collapse” for several hours after the rush of commuters
has stopped. This causes further delay for motorists who arrive later in the day.
With peak-period highway pricing, a variable toll dissuades some motorists from
using limited access highways (generally freeways) at critical locations where traffic demand is high, and where surges in demand may push the highway over the
threshold at which traffic flow collapses. Pricing prevents a breakdown of traffic
flow in the first instance, and thus maintains a high level of vehicle speed and
throughput throughout the rush hours. Collapse of traffic flow from overcrowding is avoided. Not only are more motorists able get to their destinations during
each hour—they also get there faster. Each priced lane in the median of State
Route 91 in Orange County, California (on which traffic flow is managed using
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variable tolls) carries twice as many vehicles per lane as the adjacent toll-free lanes
during the hour with heaviest traffic (U.S. Department of Transportation 2005).
Management of traffic flow through pricing has allowed twice as many vehicles to
be served per lane at three to four times the speed on the free lanes.
Currently, U.S. freeway systems use congestion delay as a way to ration scarce road
space during rush hours. Delay imposes huge social costs on the traveling public
and on the economy, and is an extremely wasteful way to allocate scarce road
space. If freeway road space were instead rationed using variable tolls, the revenue
generated would simply be a transfer of resources from motorists to the highway
operator, and would not be a waste. The revenue could be used to generate further
benefits for commuters or to reduce taxes. Unlike taxes, the toll revenue would
be obtained from travelers willing to pay to get a direct benefit in return—the
reduced waste of their time. By reliably preventing traffic flow breakdown and
thereby ensuring a predictable trip travel time, freeway pricing would also reduce
the “buffer” time that commuters must otherwise plan into their schedules. It
would reduce fuel consumption and emissions, and reduce diversion of traffic to
alternate routes where they may cause further congestion.
It might appear counterintuitive that imposing a new toll on a currently free road
can actually reduce traffic on parallel facilities. Figure 1 and Table 1 attempt to
demonstrate how this may happen. Figure 1 shows the magnitude of the waste of
time and vehicle capacity that occurs when traffic flow breaks down on the four
eastbound lanes of I-66 outside the Capital Beltway in Northern Virginia, inbound
toward Washington, D.C. Traffic flows freely up to 7am. In the one-hour period
between 6 and 7am, 8,000 vehicles are carried at an average speed of 55 mph.
Traffic flow breaks down between 7 and 8am, with speeds dropping to 30 mph
and vehicle throughput dropping to 7,000 vehicles. From 8 to 9am, throughput
drops further to 6,000 vehicles, and average speed drops further to 25 mph. The
reduced flow of 6,000 vehicles per hour continues between 9am and 10am, with
speed increasing slightly to 30 mph. Table 1 provides estimates of time wasted, and
the potential value of time savings on the freeway if free flow of traffic could be
maintained. As much as $10 million annually could be saved on the 10-mile eastbound freeway segment with good traffic flow management in the morning peak
period. Table 1 also shows that after accommodating the 19,000 existing users of
the eastbound freeway who travel during the 7 to 10am period, there will be spare
capacity of up to 5,000 vehicles available for use from 9 to 10am. This available
capacity will draw drivers from alternative routes and from other times of the day
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(i.e., those who currently try to avoid congestion on the freeway). Thus, pricing
the freeway to maximize throughput will reduce traffic levels on alternative routes
and at other times of the day.

Figure 1. Traffic Volumes and Speeds on I-66 Eastbound
in Northern Virginia (Four Lanes, Morning Peak Period)
It takes only a small reduction in traffic demand at critical times during the peak
period to restore free flow. Motorists in Washington, D.C. experience free-flowing
traffic during rush hours in August, with only a small fraction of workers away on
vacation and less than a 10 percent drop in peak-period traffic volumes. Similar
experiences are reported in metropolitan areas in California on state holidays,
when only state employees are off work. So the key is to shift a few rush-hour travelers to other modes or to other times of travel. Estimates of transit price crosselasticity with respect to driving demand range from 0.025 to 0.056 (Glaister and
Lewis 1978). Long-term elasticities tend to be much higher (Lee 2000) due to the
ability of travelers to respond through changes in job or residential location in the
longer term. This suggests that a 5 percent reduction in driving could be achieved
by a combination of reductions in transit fares and travel time. With free-flowing
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Table 1. Potential Impacts of Congestion Pricing on I-66 Eastbound

freeways, the entire freeway network could serve as a transit “fixed guideway,”
providing travel time advantages for express bus services.
Additional reductions could be achieved through an increase in carpooling, vanpooling, flextime, and telecommuting. If freeways were free flowing, the entire
freeway network could serve as a virtual HOV network that provides toll-free service to vanpools and carpools certified by employers or the metropolitan ridesharing agency. (Certification of ridesharing vehicles avoids the need for on-highway
enforcement of occupancy requirements, which can be difficult to accomplish
and may disrupt the flow of traffic). HOVs would have a time advantage, providing
an inducement for mode shifts to HOVs. Based on before and after data from 10
HOV lane projects implemented in the United States, Richard H. Pratt, Consultant, Inc. et al. (2000) estimate that HOV lanes result in an increase of 14 percent
in average vehicle occupancy for autos, carpools, and vanpools over all lanes of the
freeway. This is equivalent to a 12.3 percent reduction in driving.
It is also important that area employees have flexibility to travel at less busy times
or to telecommute. Employers could be encouraged to provide such flexibility
for their employees, perhaps by setting target levels for the share of flextime and
telecommuting employees for employer-certified carpools to get toll exemptions.
Other motivations, such as tax incentives, may also be used.
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Preserving Motorist Choice
A pricing strategy would need to address two key issues:
1. The public is opposed to having no choice but to pay for a service that
they have been getting for free. So a pricing scheme may need to preserve the
motorist’s choice not to pay. A toll-free choice, with the same amount of motorist delay as before (or less), will be desirable, similar to the free lanes adjacent to
HOT lanes.
2. The toll price will need to be high enough that the total user-borne cost to
drive on a priced highway (i.e., time cost plus toll cost) will not be lower than
the user-borne cost to drive prior to pricing (i.e., time cost only). If the perceived
user-borne cost were lower after implementing pricing, the inducement to
drive could increase, endangering the free flow of traffic. To counter this effect,
increased inducements would then need to be provided for other modes to
compete effectively with driving.
In the priced lane projects implemented in the United States to date, motorists
have a choice not to pay tolls and suffer congestion delays in the adjacent tollfree lanes. The advantage of this approach is that no driver is made worse off. The
limitation is the huge waste of time that continues on the free lanes when traffic
flow breaks down.
Economics Nobel Prize winner William Vickrey suggested a way to preserve the
motorist’s choice not to pay on a priced highway by creating a toll-free bypass
around toll gantries placed across all existing lanes of the roadway. Motorists
who choose to do so can wait in a queue in the toll-bypass lane and pay a “time”
price equivalent to their previous congestion delay time. This solution by itself
will not work, because releasing queued vehicles after they have waited in line for
the required time period would cause traffic flow to break down. It would simply
delay the onset of congestion by a few minutes. But if the required reduction in
driving demand during the critical period is achieved by mode shifts or shifts in
time of travel, all remaining vehicles could be accommodated at free flow. Thus,
to begin with the queue delay in the bypass lane might be zero. But this would not
last long. As drivers notice the shortness of the queue delay, they would shift to
the toll-bypass lane, until the time delay in the queue would be equivalent to the
value of the (dynamically varying) toll in effect at the time. The two would be in
equilibrium.
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The length of the toll-bypass lane would depend on the toll rate and corresponding “time” price in effect, and the queue discharge rate. For example, if the toll
were $1 and the value of time of freeway travelers were 20 cents per minute (i.e.,
$12 per hour), the “time” price in the toll-bypass lane would be 5 minutes. If the
queue discharge rate were 15 vehicles per minute, the total number of vehicles to
be accommodated in the toll-bypass lane would be 75 vehicles.
System Operation
Super HOT system operation would involve conversion of all lanes on existing
freeways into premium-service free-flowing freeways that provide fast, frequent,
and inexpensive express bus service. All vehicles, except authorized buses and
certified ridesharing vehicles, would be charged a variable toll set high enough
to guarantee that high demand will not cause a breakdown of traffic flow. Tolls
would be charged during congested periods only.
A peak-period commuter would have several options:
• Pay a relatively low toll for the convenience of driving alone in free-flowing
traffic on the Super HOT highway system.
• Join a carpool or vanpool and enjoy a fast trip on the Super HOT highway
system for an even lower price by sharing the cost of the toll, or drive for
free in an employer-certified or ridesharing agency-certified carpool or
vanpool.
• Use newly expanded, faster and more convenient transit services provided
by express buses that run on the Super HOT highway system.
• Drive alone for free, either on the arterial street system (which would be
enhanced with advanced traffic signal optimization), or on the freeway by
using toll-bypass lanes constructed in advance of toll gantries. The tollbypass lanes would allow motorists to pay a “time” price in lieu of a toll, by
waiting in the toll-free queue.
Licensed drivers in the area covered by the priced network, on request, could be
issued an inexpensive electronic transponder (e.g., a “sticker” tag) free of charge,
along with a transportation account. Nonresidents could purchase the tags at
retail outlets such as 7-Elevens, or from ATM-like machines at welcome stations
located at approaches to the metropolitan area. Those not having transponders
could be “video-tolled,” meaning that cameras would take pictures of their license
plates, and the vehicle owner would be billed for the toll plus a small administrative charge to cover the extra costs. For example, on November 1, 2006, the
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Florida Turnpike Enterprise, in conjunction with the Tampa Hillsborough County
Expressway Authority, launched a “Pay-by-Plate” system, the first video-toll
account system in the United States. Customers who are occasional users of the
Lee Roy Selmon Crosstown Expressway (between Tampa and Brandon, Florida),
and do not have a transponder, can call a toll-free number to open an account.
They pay a toll of $1.25 (instead of $1.00 for those with transponders) to cover
costs to process the license plate images.
Ramp meters could be used on freeway entrance ramps to ensure that merging
of incoming traffic does not break down mainline traffic flow, and to discourage
short trips on the freeway on sections where there may not be a toll gantry.
To ensure premium service for buses and carpools when lane blockages occur as a
result of an incident, overhead lane controls would be installed. The lane controls
would provide priority for buses and certified HOVs during incidents. A clear lane
would be designated for use only by buses and certified HOVs. If there is spare
capacity available in the lane, it could be opened up to other vehicles for a premium toll set high enough to ensure that the traffic in the lane continues to flow
freely. Vehicles in other lanes that do not get service at the guaranteed speed, due
to the incident, would get an automatic refund on tolls paid.

Addressing Traffic Diversion Concerns
When toll rates are raised on existing tollways, some drivers divert to toll-free arterials or surface streets to avoid paying the higher tolls. However, unlike conventional tollways, priced highways provide many more travel options. A Super HOT
system would have several differences relative to tollways. These differences would
reduce the potential for traffic diversion to parallel toll-free facilities.
First, variable tolls would provide options to motorists to reduce or eliminate
their costs for new tolls by shifting their time of travel. In the case of tollways with
flat tolls all day, drivers cannot escape tolls or avail themselves of a lower toll rate
simply by traveling at a different time.
Second, introduction of variable tolls during congested periods would be accompanied by high-quality transit services and expanded availability of enhanced
carpool and vanpool options on free-flowing “virtual” HOV networks, so that
some solo drivers would shift to using transit, vanpools, or carpools, rather than
diverting to parallel toll-free roadways.
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Third, those who are not willing to pay the toll would have an option to wait in a
toll-bypass lane and get a high-speed, predictable trip time for free. Wait times on
the toll-bypass lanes can be expected to be lower than delays on alternative routes.
Thus, there would be no incentive to divert from the freeway.
Fourth, when pricing is introduced on previously congested highways, some
motorists who had been deterred by freeway congestion and had diverted to
parallel arterials may shift back to the free-flowing priced highways, which would
accommodate higher rush-hour traffic volumes in a shorter period of time, as
explained previously with the I-66 example. Despite this shift from arterials, however, as long as parallel arterials remain toll free, new motorists (e.g., those who
shift from other less convenient times of travel) can be expected to take the place
of any traffic that shifts from the arterials to the priced highways. Thus, while total
hourly vehicle and person trip throughput in the corridor may increase, severity
of arterial congestion cannot be expected to improve significantly during key
congested periods. However, the duration of congestion (i.e., the length of the
congested period) can be expected to be shortened. For example, the availability
of spare capacity on I-66 from 9am to 10am will draw traffic from parallel arterials,
reducing congestion on the arterials during that hour.
Finally, if toll revenues are used to pay for optimizing traffic signal controls on
parallel arterials (in cases where they may not currently be optimized), this could
help to further improve traffic flow on them.

Advantages of a Super HOT Transportation System
An entire metropolitan Super HOT network can be put in place in a relatively
short period of time. Time-consuming and lengthy environmental review processes generally associated with freeway widening projects will not delay implementation. Some new investment will be needed for the initial shoulder bus lanes,
toll-bypass lanes, management and operation of the freeway and arterial networks,
new express bus and vanpool services, and new park-and-ride facilities. However,
these will not require the extent of environmental review normally necessary for
road-widening projects.
The Super HOT concept has several advantages over the managed lane approach.
Since all lanes would be priced, there would be no need for additional rights-ofway and pavement for barrier or buffer separation between priced lanes and tollfree general-purpose lanes. Neither would expensive connector ramps be needed
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for efficient movement of priced vehicles through busy freeway interchanges. All
lanes would be available for use by all vehicles. This would maximize motorists’
freedom to switch lanes and consequently maximize highway capacity. A slower
moving vehicle in a separated single lane causes a gap to build up in front of it,
reducing vehicle throughput. Additionally, vehicle throughput per lane is lower
when fewer adjacent lanes are available for use by all traffic, since drivers of faster
vehicles find it more difficult to switch lanes and overtake slower vehicles to
occupy large gaps between vehicles.
Super HOT highways would allow direct access to premium service lanes from all
existing freeway entrance ramps. They would avoid the need for traffic to merge
into and out of priced lanes from adjacent general-purpose lanes. Such weaving
movements are inconvenient for buses and for motorists, and reduce safety and
highway capacity on the free lanes.
With Super HOT highways, much more premium service capacity would be available on multiple lanes. Therefore, relatively lower toll rates would be sufficient
to ensure that traffic demand does not rise above available capacity. This would
make use of the highway more affordable to a larger population of middle- and
lower-income motorists. And those who cannot afford the toll nor shift their
mode or time of travel would be no worse off than before, since they could choose
a toll-bypass lane and pay a “time” price no higher than their previous delay time,
to get free-flowing service on the freeway in return.
Finally, with a Super HOT system, all lanes are congestion free.

Benefits and Revenues
A sketch-planning tool, Tool for Rush-hour User Charge Evaluation (TRUCE), was
developed by the author to assist in the estimation of the potential impacts of a
Super HOT transportation facility or network, in particular the costs, benefits, and
revenues.
Two scenarios were assessed, representing a range of congestion levels on freeway
networks in major metropolitan areas in the United States. These scenarios were
evaluated for a prototypical area (either an entire metropolitan area or a significant portion of a major metropolitan area) with approximately 1.0 million drivers
and an existing 100-mile freeway network comprising a total of 600 lane miles (i.e.,
freeways with an average of 6 lanes; 3 lanes in each direction). The scenarios are
as follow:
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1. A moderately congested freeway network, with an average peak-period speed
of 40 mph and a total of 4 hours of congestion per day (i.e., about 2 hours
in the morning and about 2 hours in the afternoon). Note that the “average” speed of 40 mph represents a composite of quite high traffic speeds
on some segments of the network and much lower speeds on other segments. For example, if half of all vehicles travel at a speed of 60 mph (i.e., 1
minute to travel 1 mile) and the other half travel at a speed of 30 mph (i.e.,
2 minutes to travel 1 mile), the average speed of all vehicles would be 40
mph (i.e., 1.5 minutes to travel 1 mile). Assuming a free-flow freeway speed
of 60 mph, this scenario represents a peak-period “travel time index” of 1.5
(i.e., ratio of average peak-period travel time to free-flow travel time; Texas
Transportation Institute 2005).
2. An extremely congested freeway network, with average peak-period speeds
of 30 mph and a total of 6 hours of congestion per day (i.e., about 2.5 hours
in the morning and about 3.5 hours in the afternoon). For example, if half of
all vehicles travel at a speed of 60 mph (i.e., 1 minute to travel 1 mile) and
the other half travel at a speed of 20 mph (i.e., 3 minutes to travel 1 mile),
the average speed of all vehicles would be 30 mph (i.e., 2 minutes to travel
1 mile). This scenario represents a peak-period “travel time index” of 2.0.
For comparison, in 2003, the average daily congested travel period in major U.S.
metropolitan areas amounted to about 6.5 hours (Texas Transportation Institute
2005). By using relatively fewer hours of congestion in this analysis, we ensure a
conservative estimate of toll revenue and benefits from travel time savings.
Estimates of Travel Impacts
The analysis assumes that flextime, telecommuting arrangements, transit, and
ridesharing will in aggregate attract about 16 percent of motorists from driving
alone on the priced highways during critical times during the congested periods.
(The basis of this assumption is discussed later in this article). A drop of 16 percent in traffic volume will also result in a very significant reduction in delay. Under
normal circumstances, the reduced “time” cost would induce additional drivers to
use the facility, causing congestion to recur. With pricing, however, variable tolls
would be set high enough to ensure free flow of traffic. The toll rates would therefore be equivalent to the value of time that is saved, so that total user-borne cost
to use the facility stays roughly the same. Consequently, additional travel would
not be induced. There may, of course, be a change in the demographic composition of users. Those with higher values of time would perceive a reduction in their
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costs, and would increase their use of the priced highway. This will be balanced
by a reduction in use by those with a lower value of time, who will perceive an
increase in their costs.
To simplify the analytical process, we make several assumptions. Table 2 presents
an analysis of what these assumptions mean in terms of the various categories of
freeway travelers. It uses as an example an existing “base” peak-period freeway
throughput of 20,000 person trips. This existing travel is carried in a little less than
18,000 vehicles. Assumptions and their plausibility are demonstrated through the
example in Table 2, and are explained below.
Table 2. An Example of Redistribution of Mode of Travel
with Congestion Pricing
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Due to reductions in transit travel time and fares, it is assumed that approximately
a third of diverted travelers (i.e., 5% of total existing peak-period users) will shift to
use of express buses. This is consistent with the cross-elasticity estimates discussed
earlier.
It is assumed that ridesharing will increase from an existing level of 18 percent of
person trips (or 10% of existing vehicle volume) to about 30 percent of person
trips. This assumption amounts to a 12.5 percent increase in average vehicle occupancy (AVO) for autos, carpools, and vanpools, from 1.10 to 1.24, as indicated in
the example provided in Table 2. This 12.5 percent increase in AVO is less than
the average AVO increase of 14 percent observed for 10 HOV lane projects implemented in the United States (Richard H. Pratt, Consultant, Inc. et al. 2000).
It is assumed that an additional 3 percent of drivers will choose to telecommute
or travel at other times. Given the potential of teleworking, and National Household Travel Survey data indicating that 10 to 23 percent of peak-period trips are
made solely to shop (U.S. Department of Transportation 2004), this is a plausible
assumption.
It is assumed that half of all travelers would continue to drive solo, paying the
full toll. It is plausible that 50 percent of travelers would have a value of time that
exceeds the average value of time, based on which the toll rate is estimated. They
would value the time savings more than the toll. It is assumed that an additional
10 percent of travelers would pay half the going toll rate by sharing the toll with
another person in a noncertified carpool.
Finally, it is assumed that the balance of 10 percent of travelers (11% of existing
drivers) will choose to use the toll-bypass lanes.
Overall, these assumptions translate to about 16 percent of total peak-period
vehicle traffic demand shifting to other modes, to other times of travel, or to telecommuting. While anecdotal evidence suggests that a 10 percent shift would be
adequate, the higher percentage shift provides a factor of safety.
Estimates of Highway User Benefits
As shown in Table 3, TRUCE begins with estimation of average travel time that
would be saved on a trip that uses a 10-mile segment of the freeway network.
These savings are converted into monetary values, based on the inflation-adjusted
average value of time per hour per person recommended by U.S. DOT (U.S.
Department of Transportation 2002). Although generally not perceived by motorists, delay reductions also result in significant fuel consumption savings, due to
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fewer accelerations and braking events. To be conservative in estimating benefits,
estimates of fuel consumption savings are based on estimates of fuel saved by a
small car per minute of delay reduced, as documented in the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Official’s (AASHTO’s) User Benefit
Analysis for Highways Manual (ECONorthwest et al. 2003).

Table 3. Benefits to Toll-Paying Motorists

Table 3 presents user cost savings per freeway trip for those paying the toll. Net
user cost savings per freeway trip are estimated by subtracting the toll cost from
the monetary value of time and fuel cost savings. For certified carpools, travel time
savings are multiplied by auto occupancy to get total time savings. For informal
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carpools that pay tolls, it is assumed that the total time savings of occupants will
be equal to the value of the toll paid. Net user cost savings are thus equal to the
value of fuel savings, as they are for solo drivers. While average values of time are
useful in estimating aggregate benefits for all motorists, motorists’ values of time
are actually distributed over a range. Motorists with higher values of time will
perceive proportionally higher benefits. Motorists with lower values of time would
perceive disbenefits if they had to pay a toll, and would respond to new congestion tolls by choosing the toll-free bypass lane, or by diverting to other modes,
routes, or times of the day. Their disbenefits (i.e., “consumer surplus” losses) are
accounted for in aggregate highway benefit estimates provided in Table 4.
For the purpose of estimating the average peak-period toll rate, we assume that:
• In deciding whether to pay the toll, motorists would consider how much
delay they would incur in the toll-bypass lane and compare the equivalent
monetary cost of that delay to the going toll rate.
• A current freeway motorist who wants to avoid the toll by waiting in the
toll-bypass lane would face a travel time equal to the “base” congested travel
time on the freeway (i.e., prior to introduction of pricing). If this delay were
lower than before, additional travel would be induced. If it were higher,
diversion to alternative routes could occur.
• Of those motorists who decide to pay the toll (i.e., 50% of all travelers), the
solo driver who values his or her time the least would have a value of time
equal to the average value of time for all travelers (i.e., $12 per hour). This
value, along with the queue delay time, determines the toll rate. The two
would be in equilibrium.
Based on a value of time of $12 per hour, the average peak-period toll for a 10mile freeway trip is estimated to range from about $1 to $2 for passenger cars. It
is assumed that trucks would pay toll rates that reflect their relative passenger car
equivalents. Since a heavy truck on average consumes two to three times the lane
capacity of a passenger car in free-flowing traffic, toll rates for trucks would average about 2.5 times the toll rates for passenger cars.
Table 4 provides estimates of highway benefits and toll revenues for the two
scenarios. Existing peak-period demand for freeway use is estimated to be equal
to the total vehicle volume that currently uses the freeway during the congested
peak period. Over all lanes in both directions of the freeway, existing hourly peakperiod traffic volume is assumed to be 1,800 vehicles per lane. This accounts for
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both lost throughput in the heavy traffic direction, as well as vehicle volumes in
the reverse direction.
Table 4. Highway User Benefits and Toll Revenues

32

Managing Limited Access Highways for High Performance

Social benefits of the network are estimated by accounting for:
1. Net user cost savings on the priced freeway. Benefits to those who continue
to travel on the freeway are estimated based on the benefits per vehicle
trip calculated in Table 3. Losses of consumer surplus by motorists who shift
from driving alone on the freeway are estimated based on the rule of half.
It is calculated as the number of deterred motorists times half the difference between (1) monetary value of motorists’ travel time plus toll cost on
priced freeways and (2) monetary value of motorists’ travel time cost prior
to pricing. Given typical observed distributions of values of time of motorists (Steimetz and Brownstone 2004), it is reasonable to assume that the 16
percent of all motorists who shift from driving alone in the peak periods on
the freeway would have a value of time equal to about 75 percent of the
average value of time (i.e., $9).
2. Toll revenue “transfers” from motorists to the system operator. (Tolls paid
by motorists are subtracted in computing net user cost savings under item
1 above.)
3. Reductions in government fuel tax receipts due to reduced fuel consumption
estimated at 40 cents per gallon for state and federal taxes combined. (Fuel
taxes are included in fuel cost savings estimated to compute user cost savings under item 1 above.)
Several components of social benefits are not included in the above social benefit
calculations:
1. Benefits from an increase in trip time reliability. With more predictable trip
times, travelers will be able to reduce the “buffer” time that they build into
their schedules. Surveys of travelers who use priced lanes in San Diego and
in Orange County, California, suggest that travelers perceive that they save
almost twice the amount of time that they actually save. This may simply
reflect a reduction in the amount of “buffer” time that they allocate for
their trips, due to the reliability of their trip times.
2. Environmental and safety benefits, such as reductions in air pollution, noise,
and greenhouse gas emissions, and accident cost reductions. Environmental
benefits are expected to be positive, since mode shifts will reduce vehicle
traffic, and higher traffic speeds will reduce most emissions. Shortening
of response times for emergency personnel may save lives. With reduced
traffic, the number of accidents would also be reduced; however, severity
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of accidents would increase due to higher speeds, raising the average cost
per accident.
3. Impacts of traffic diversion on congestion levels on parallel toll-free routes. As
discussed earlier, modal and time of travel choices and the availability of
the toll-bypass lane are expected to limit traffic diversion, so any negative
impacts are expected to be minor, and positive impacts may occur due to
increased vehicle and person throughput in the freeway corridor.
4. Benefits to businesses and the economy, including productivity benefits from
reduced freight delays and increased reliability of deliveries.
5. Increase in energy security due to reduced fuel consumption.
6. Increased opportunities for civic participation.
7. Reduced distortions in the housing market.
Based on the above analysis, annual benefits are estimated to range from $123
million to $370 million. Toll revenues are estimated to range from $67 million to
$200 million annually.
Transit Benefits
Table 5 presents estimates of transit benefits. Travel time savings for existing bus
passengers are assumed to be equivalent to those accruing to motorists. Operating cost savings for existing bus services are computed by combining driver time
savings and bus fuel cost savings. Fuel cost savings are based on AASHTO estimates
of fuel consumption per minute of delay for a single-unit truck (ECONorthwest
2003).
Existing bus service is estimated at 6 buses per hour, with 40 passengers per bus,
resulting in an estimated 240 riders per rush hour in each freeway corridor. This
amounts to 2 percent of travelers on a 6-lane freeway carrying 12,000 people per
rush hour (i.e., 2,000 people per lane, based on 1,800 vehicles per lane per hour and
an average vehicle occupancy of about 1.10).
As discussed earlier, our analysis assumes that 5 percent of freeway drivers (i.e., a
third of the 16% diverted rush-hour solo drivers) will use transit. Benefits to new
transit riders are estimated based on the rule of half (i.e., half of the change in travel
time costs, times the estimated number of new riders).
Table 5 indicates that annual transit benefits would range from $6 million to $17.5
million. Total highway and transit benefits combined would range from $129 million to $388 million.
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Table 5. Transit Benefits
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Costs
Highway Operating Costs
To estimate capital costs for toll collection, an open-road electronic toll collection system was assumed, with toll gantries installed at 5-mile intervals, and at the
boundaries of the priced network. Unit capital cost estimates were provided by
Mitretek (personal communication from Paul Gonzalez, September 2006). Total
capital costs were annualized based on a 7 percent discount rate and 30-year life.
Average operating costs for toll collection are estimated at 8.5 cents per trip, based
on an estimate of 5 to 10 cents per trip by ITS Decision, Service and Technologies
(2005). Since toll collection costs will decrease with large-scale implementation,
this is a conservative estimate.
In addition to toll collection costs, highway operations will involve costs for traffic management, such as operation of variable message signs, traffic monitoring
equipment, and communications. Data from the I-15 FasTrak budget and expenditure data for FY 2005 indicate that annual costs for both traffic management
and toll collection on the dynamically priced I-15 HOT facility in San Diego were
about $0.7 million in fiscal year 2005. The facility carried about 5 million vehicles
during that year, about 75 percent of them nontolled HOVs. The remaining 25
percent were tolled vehicles. Subtracting costs for tolling (at 10 cents per trip),
traffic management costs for the year are estimated at $575,000, or 11.5 cents per
vehicle served. Based on these cost estimates, a total cost of 20 cents per vehicle
trip was estimated for tolling and traffic management combined.
As shown in Table 6, total annual operating costs for toll collection and traffic
management would range from $13 to $20 million, with the higher costs associated with a longer congested period in areas with high existing congestion levels.
Capital costs would be $68 million, or annualized costs of $5.5 million. Additional
capital costs would be incurred for construction of toll-bypass lanes. It is estimated
that a total of 20 lane-miles of new pavement (i.e., 40 half-mile sections) would
need to be constructed, and that existing rights-of-way would be adequate. At
an average cost of $3 million per lane mile, capital costs for toll-bypass lanes are
estimated at $60 million, or annualized costs of $4.8 million.
Total annualized highway system costs would range from $23 to $30 million.
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Table 6. Annualized Highway System Costs (Thousands of Dollars)

Transit and Park-and-Ride Costs
The express bus system would need to carry all travelers who would shift from
driving on the freeway to transit (i.e., 5% of peak-period freeway demand that is
expected to shift to transit), as discussed earlier. As indicated in Table 7, depend37
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ing on existing levels of congestion, new daily ridership is estimated to range from
22,000 to 32,000, or 5 million to 8 million annually.

Table 7. Transit and Park-and-Ride Costs

Transit subsidy needs were estimated at 50 cents per passenger mile, based on
nationwide subsidies of $23.5 billion supporting 50 billion passenger miles annually (Taylor and VanDoren 2002). An average bus passenger trip was estimated
at 12 miles, based on work trip length data (U.S. Department of Transportation
2004). Total annual transit subsidy costs are estimated to range from $32 million
to $48 million.
Most of the new park-and-ride spaces will be needed in exurban or suburban
locations. At these locations, it is more likely that a public agency will own land
within existing rights-of-way near interchanges or along the freeway. It may therefore be possible to build new park-and-ride facilities on surface lots, adjacent to
express bus stations. Also, it may be possible to use existing parking spaces at
shopping centers near the freeway, reducing new construction costs. Parking costs
38

Managing Limited Access Highways for High Performance

are estimated at $2.00 per parking space per day, based on annualized costs for
construction and maintenance of surface parking spaces in outer suburbs (U.S.
Department of Transportation 1992), adjusted for inflation. Total annual costs
for providing parking are estimated at $5 million to $8 million, with the high-end
costs associated with higher transit use in more congested areas.
Total combined annual costs for transit subsidies and parking at park-and-ride lots
are estimated to range from $38 million to $57 million.
Financial Feasibility
Table 8 summarizes estimates of toll revenues, benefits, and costs of the multimodal pricing package. Benefit/cost ratios would range from 2.1 to 4.4, depending on the severity of existing levels of congestion. Because of the conservative
assumptions used to estimate benefits in the analysis, these estimates are conservative. The results suggest that the multimodal pricing package would be
financially self-sufficient. Surplus revenue would be much higher in more severely
congested areas, because of higher toll rates as well as longer congested periods
during which tolls would be charged. Annual toll revenue surpluses would range
from $5 million to $114 million.

Table 8. Benefits, Costs, and Financial Feasibility
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Conclusions
A Super HOT transportation network in a large metropolitan area could provide
social benefits that far exceed multimodal investment and operating costs. Revenues from tolls would be sufficient to pay for all costs, including new express bus
services and park-and-ride services that would complement the pricing scheme.
The multimodal pricing package would be financially self-sufficient, with annual
toll revenue surpluses depending on the severity of congestion. A limited shortterm “trial” demonstrating the concept in a congested corridor may help show if
the concept will work, and lead to public acceptance of larger-scale implementation.
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